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This project is an in-depth study of flexible 
manufacturing in the New England textile finishing industry. 
Chapter 1 represents a literature review of the current 
debate surrounding the flexibility issue. 
Chapter 2 provides a brief outline of the methodology 
of the project. 
Chapter 3 provides a history of the textile industry, 
both in New England, and the United States as a whole. 
Chapter 4 zones in specifically on the textile 
finishing industry. It describes the production processes 
involved in finishing, and gives figures for employment 
within the industry at the national level. This chapter 
also identifies the ten key SIC codes that make up the 
finishing industry. 
Chapter 5 looks at industrial organization. It 
provides general information about the impact of imports on 
the industry as a whole, and the implications that this has 
for textile finishing. Further, it addresses the issues of 
profitability, productivity, supplier-customer relations, 
and firm size within the finishing industry. 
Chapter 6 addresses the issue of whether flexibility is 
increasing in textile finishing in New England. 
Chapter 7 provides a summary of the industry interviews 
that the study team for this project has undertaken at the 
lll 
time of writing this research project. 
Chapter 8 provides conclusions and policy implicati ons 
that can be drawn at this stage in the research. 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank pr. Marshall Feldman, Assistant 
Professor, Department of Community Planning, for giving me 
the opportunity to work on this project, and for his 
patience and reassurance ~n my moments of confusion. 
I would like to thank Dr. Richard Mcintyre, Department 
of Economics, and Dr. Marcia Feld, Department of Community 
Planning, for all their help as readers for this research 
project. 
I would like to thank my Mother and Father, who, though 
they were three thousand miles away when I wrote this, were 
the ones who encouraged me as a child to get this far. 
Finally, I would like to thank Michael for making my 
time in the United States really worth it. 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT .......................... . ................ . iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................... . .. . .... . ... . .. . v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................. . Vl 
LIST OF TABLES ................. . ................... . Vlll 
Chapt e rs 
1 THE FLEXIBILITY DEBATE............................ 1 
The Flexibility Debate.............................. 1 
Agglomeration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Adaptations to the Flexibility Theory............... 6 
Flex ibi lity and Labor............................... 7 
Flex ibi l ity and Regional Economies.................. 8 
Alternative Models of Industrial 
Organization........................................ 10 
Flex ible Specialization and the Textile Industry.... 18 
2 METHODOLOGY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
3 HISTORY OF THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY................... 23 
The Transition to Mechanization....... .. ............ 23 
The Shi ft of Textiles to the South............... . .. 28 
The Texti le Industry Today.......... . ............... 31 
4 THE PRODUCTION PROCESS............................ 36 
Fabric Finishing Processes................ . ......... 37 
Textile Finishing SIC Codes........ .. .... . .......... 41 
Total Employment in Textile Finishing............... 43 
5 INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION........................... 49 
Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 
Employment Trends in the Textile Industry........... 49 
Restructuring. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
Imports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
Textile Wages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 
Number of Establishments...................... . ..... 56 
State of the Industry............................... 56 
6 IS FLEXIBILITY INCREASING? ...... . .................. 59 
Flex ibility and the Textile Finishing Industry in 
New Englan d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 
The Blu r r i ng o f the Lines Between Mass Producti o n 
and F lexibl e Specialization......................... 61 
Textil e Finishing in New England.............. . ..... 63 
v i 
Characterization of the Industry.................... 63 
Conclusion.......................................... 70 
7 FINDINGS OF THE INDUSTRY INTERVIEWS............... 71 
Company History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 
Production Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 
Location. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5 
Employees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6 
Customers/Suppliers................................. 79 
Future of the Industry and Imports.................. 80 
8 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS............... 82 
Characteristics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 
Con cl us ions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6 
Policy Implications................................. 87 
Implications for Community Planning................. 88 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Vll 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 Value of Regional Cotton Textile Output ..... 30 
Table 2 Trade Data: Textile Mill Products ........... 33 
Table 3 Total Textile Finishing Employment as a 
% of Total Manufacturing Employment ......... 45 
Table 4 Textile Finishing Total Employment by SIC ... 48 
Table 5 Imports and Exports of Textiles ............. 50 
Table 6 Textile Industry Wages and Employment ....... 55 
Table 7 Number of Establishments in Finishing ....... 57 
Table 8 Trade Data for 1972-1985 . ... . .. . ........... 66 
Table 9 Total Numbers Employed in Textile 
Finishing for the United States, 1987 ...... 68 
Vlll 
CHAP~Rl 
THE FLEXIBILITY DEBATE 
The world we find ourselves in today is very different 
from that of the immediate post-war period. Economic 
downturns seem no longer to be short pauses in the 
progression to greater affluence. Rather, these downturns 
seem to pose a real threat to the economic system on which 
post-war growth is based. Piore and Sabel (1984) assert 
that the present deterioration in economic performance 
results from the limits of the model of industrial 
development founded on mass production. 1 Piore and Sabel 
question the viability of large, vertically integrated firms 
engaged in mass production, that once characterized an 
unprecedented period of growth, and suggest that today the 
most successful industries are increasingly characterized by 
"flexible specialization", a term indicating spatially dense 
networks of relatively small, vertically disintegrated 
firms. 
The Flexibility Debate 
Support for this hypothesis has been mixed. Some 
empirical studies strongly support the claims made by Piore 
and Sabel (1984), while others have found alternative forms 
1 Mass production is defined as the use of special-purpose 
(product specific) machines and of semiskilled workers to produce 
large quantities of standardized goods. 
1 
of industrial organization are in fact becoming important. 
This chapter will review these divergent perspectives. 
Feldman and Yuan (1990:2) point to the fact that the 
debate over flexibility is ~ore and more being placed on 
theoretical ground demarcated by the French "Regulation 
School" of political economy. In this approach, periods of 
stable growth in capitalist economies require a wide variety 
of non-market institutions, norms, and practices. These 
historical entities collectively constitute an "accumulation 
regime", determine the system's characteristics functioning, 
or "mode of regulation." They note that if it were not 
situated in this context, much debate over flexibility would 
not exist. 
At one end of the spectrum, Piore and Sabel lay out the 
concept of flexible specialization and offer it as the more 
viable of two alternatives, the other being multinational 
Keynesianism. They do not, however, overlook its problems. 
For example, they note the difficulties of envisaging a 
flexible economy that is successful, as there is no model on 
which to build such a notion, and this would require what 
they refer to as an exercise of the imagination. 
Piore and Sabel offer four types of flexible 
specialization. The first is regional conglomerations. 
Under this category they offer the examples of specialized 
districts of northern and central Italy, the New York 
garment district, and the construction industry in most 
2 
cities in the United States. 
This model is characterized by no one of the firms 
being dominant, and contracts or arrangements between firms 
are short-term, with the roles played by the various parties 
constantly changing. In this situation there are 
institutions that act to assist in the recombination and 
coordinatio n o f the production process. No one firm links 
all processes of production. Rather, cohesion rests on a 
strong community sense among the collected firms. 
The second type of flexible specialization is federated 
enterprises. This form is associated with the "systeme 
Motte" and Japanese companies. Here the "federated 
enterprises hold one another's stocks and have interlocking 
boards of directors." (Piore, Sabel, 1984) The firm is not 
organized under an hierarchy structure, as with the mass 
production s y stem. 
The third and fourth forms of flexible specialization 
are the firm with the solar-system model of orbiting 
suppliers and its close cousin, the workshop factory. Such 
firms are organized in nineteenth century style workshops. 
Aqg1omeration 
Scott (1988) takes the concept of fle x ible 
specialization and adds a new dimensi on, that of 
agglomeration. Agglomeration is the process whereby 
vertically disi ntegrated firms cluster together to increase 
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the.ir combined total volume. Localization economies are 
achieved for all firms in a single industry at a single 
location, consequent upon the enlargement of the total 
output of that industry at that location. 
Scott observes that by the 1970s, in the face of the 
deepening unworkability of the fordist regime the 
governments of countries in North America and Western Europe 
started to dismantle the welfare-statist arrangements that 
had helped to regulate it but were now only becoming an 
additional element of the overall crisis. 
As this one regime of accumulation began to collapse, 
in the vacuum that was created, another was beginning to 
take shape. In particular, Scott refers to the emergence of 
a number of new flexible forms of productive activity. He 
believes these are concentrated in three groups of 
industrial sectors: revivified artisanal and design-
intensive industries producing outputs largely but not 
exclusively for final consumption, high technology 
industries and their associated group of input suppliers and 
dependent subcontractors, and service functions, especially 
business services (Scott, 1988:175). 
Scott takes Piore and Sabel's theory one step further 
by grafting the concept of agglomeration onto the flexible 
specialization hypothesis. He suggests that with the 
process of vertical disintegration symptomatic of flexible 
specialization, comes a ''countervailing disadvantage" in the 
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rise of certain kinds of costs. These he identifies as the 
direct expenses of transport, communication, information 
exchange, search, and scanning. 
Scott sees evidence of this new industrial form taking 
shape in two specific areas. The first of is the inner-city 
areas where there are older manufacturing based industries. 
He believes evidence points to the reemergence here of the 
old craft form of production in for example, clothing, 
furniture and the film industry in Los Angeles. He 
believes that suburban extensions are also included, the 
classic example being Route 128 outside of Boston. Scott 
observes that in areas such as route 128 employers 
deliberately exclude the traditional male workforce and 
instead seek out females and recent immigrants for 
production jobs. 
The second area Scott identifies is the sunbelt and 
what he refers to as the third development zones of North 
America and Western Europe. These areas have been typically 
characterized as being peripheral to the old core regions of 
Fordist industries. Their economies have been largely 
composed of agriculture, trade and small-scale industry, 
with urban settlement being limited until recent times. 
These peripheral and semi-peripheral areas are, according to 
Scott, now constituting many of the new industrial spaces. 
Scott points to the example of the "Third Italy". This 
area has grown over the last three decades with industries 
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that are highly flexible. This growth is particularly 
significant when one considers that this part of Italy lay 
on the periphery in the days of mass production . 
Other examples offered by Scott include high tech areas 
which are thriving in such isolated areas as Cambridge, 
England and Grenoble, France. Scott contends that 
establishments in these areas, like those in the Third 
Italy, rely on small interlinked establishments. 
Adaptations of the Flexibility Theory 
Storper (1989) addresses the generality of the issue 
of flexible specialization. He poses the question of 
whether places as different as Silicon Valley in California 
and the New York City garment district can realistically be 
examples of the same phenomenon or whether the debate has 
created what he refers to as a "chaotic conception''. He 
asserts that the different examples of flexible 
specialization have different roots, but that this does not 
lead to the conclusion that -they are isolated local 
occurrences bearing no resemblance to each other. 
Storper takes up the question of whether or not 
flexible specialization methods are becoming dominant. He 
acknowledges the critics who cite the example that even in 
industries where flexible specialization does occur, there 
is still a large amount of mass production involved. He 
identifies the divide in opinion between those who persist 
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in looking at technologies and production units only, in 
contrast to those who look at technologies in organizational 
context and units in the context of production systems. 
Storper believes that what must be done to make a valid 
argument that a new, general period of capitalist economic 
development is occurring is to take what he refers to as the 
''hard cases" which are the large, complex products in 
capital-intensive industries. Storper goes on to use the 
illustration of a study undertaken of the automobile 
industry in France. Amidst claims that the industry was 
actually a more automated form of mass production, he 
actually found a form of mass production operating alongside 
production units that were internally flexible. He further 
asserts that system logics are increasingly those of 
flexibility. 
Flexibility and Labor 
Schoenberger (1988b) accepts much of the theoretical 
underpinning of the flexibility theory, but questions the 
bright reality portrayed by its exponents. She points to 
the fact that flexible specialization promises little for 
those workers who have borne the brunt of industrial 
restructuring. She goes on to observe that those who 
survive the transition will have less to look forward to 
than under mass production. There may be gains in job 
stability and union relations, as fle xibility requires more 
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participation of workers than was needed under fordism. 
Schoenberger also sees flexible specialization as demanding 
extremely flexible work schedules, for example the growth of 
part-time work is seen as increasing flexibility. 
The problems with this new organizational structure are 
not limited to the lower ranks of the workforce. With 
workers on the shop-floor having been made redundant, 
upper-echelon workers will increasingly become the major 
labor-cost concern for the firm. Further, with increasing 
pressure to reduce the cycle time from design to 
manufacturing, efforts will move apace to standardize and 
automate design and programming tasks. 
Mass production was based on the broad expansion of 
incomes, yet writers have observed that flexible 
specialization has been characterized by a social 
polarization of incomes. In addition, to this phenomenon of 
few rich people keeping the economy going, support from the 
welfare state to the poor is increasingly being withdrawn. 
Schoenberger concludes that the transition to a 
flexible mode of accumulation will be fraught with troubles 
of its own. Indeed, the result may well be a crisis of 
effective demand. 
Flexibility and Regional Economies 
Sabel (1988) argues that until the mid-nineteenth 
century the region was the unit of economic activity. He 
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asserts that regions such as Sheffield, England, were both 
flexible and specialized. By the 1960s the giant 
corporation had replaced the region as being the main unit 
of economic activity, and with this organizational shift 
came all the traits of mass production. However, by the 
1970s, when international competition rose, and world 
markets began to fragment, the same firms that had adopted 
mass production methods, became wary of investment in 
product-specific machinery due to the vulnerability of 
markets and rapidly changing demand. In response to this 
volatility, firms increasingly experimented with flexible 
organizational forms, which allowed for a more rapid 
response. Sabel asserts that this move to more flexible 
responses has led to the reconsolidation of the region as an 
integrated unit of production. 
Sabel identifies four developments that have 
contributed to this process. First he sees the emergence of 
prosperous modern day versions of industrial districts in 
Western Europe and North America. Second, Sabel points to 
the reorganization of the large multinational corporation 
and the rise of subcontracting. Third, Sabel points to the 
transformation of local governments from performing a 
welfare role, to performing the role of job-creation 
agencies. Finally Sabel notes that trade unions are 
cooperating in industrial reorganization. 
Sabel also sees several problems. Even if regional 
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economies do emerge, they are unlikely to survive without 
the aid of national institutions, still undefined. Flexibly 
specialized firms may be better able to survive economic 
turbulence than mass production firms are. This does not 
make them immune to failure. Crisis regions must be 
assisted by buoyant areas if they are to survive. If this 
is to be successfully achieved a new national system of 
resource allocation may need to be created. 
A1ternative Models of Industrial Organization 
Donaghu and Barff (1990) argue that they have found an 
alternative to flexible specialization. They argue that 
Nike's production system represents an alternative post-
Fordist form of industrial organization to manufacturing 
based on flexible specialization. 
Donaghu and Barff (1990) show, "that within Nike, 
inflexible means of production coexist with highly flexible 
and dynamic forms of company organization." One of the main 
focuses of the paper concerns Nike's subcontracting 
relations; Nike subcontracts 100% of it's athletic footwear 
production. 
Nike uses three main strategies to promote its 
subcontracting relationships. These techniques are used to 
encourage and secure stability and trust in relationships 
with subcontractors. First, Nike operates what it refers to 
as an "expatriate program" where Nike expatriate technicians 
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become permanent personnel in the factory producing Nike 
footwear. The rationale is that their presence helps t o 
insure a smooth product development process and maintain 
quality control. Second, Nike encourages its partners to 
participate in joint product development activities. These 
close ties to keep Nike's production partners up to date 
with the directions Nike plans to take in the marketplace. 
Third, with factories that only manufacture Nike products, 
the company places orders once a month, thus avoiding 
production varying by more than 20 percent each month. This 
acts as a stabilizer on production for factories that have 
been with Nike for many years as well as those that are 
newer. 
The second focus of the paper supplements 
Schoenberger's work (1988a), that of a critical evaluation 
of the "New International Division of Labor" model. 
According to Donaghu and Barff, (1990:3) 
Nike's organization of production is influenced by 
the attraction of low-wage labor in the periphery 
and only marginally by -the market potential such 
locations hold. The geography of the Nike 
production system however, is also determined by 
the nature and the stability of the long term 
partnerships it has established with its 
producers. Since 1980, Nike's manufacturing 
organization has become progressively 
reconcentrated in South East Asia. 
In terms of flexibility in machinery, the only elements 
of Nike's machinery found to be flexible is the computer-
aided design, computer-aided engineering, and some of the 
numerically controlled machines used by several South Korean 
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subcontractors. Thus the authors draw the conclusion that 
machinery within the firm must be considered inflex ible. 
Donaghu and Barff see labor at Nike as numerically 
rather than functionally flexible. Numerical flexibility is 
the propensity of firms to adjust the quantity of labor used 
in production. Functional flexibility is the case in which 
production workers are responsible for not only 
manufacturing but also process innovation, training, meeting 
with customers, and maintaining equipment. 
Nike has a history of shifting production between 
regions and countries. Further, it uses capacity 
subcontracting to meet changing market demand. Nike 
produces footwear with mass production methods, but it also 
relies on extensive subcontracting networks. Donaghu and 
Barff note that Gertler (1988), Cooke (1988), Holmes (1988), 
and Anderson and Holmes (1989) have pointed out with 
reference to the automative industry, flexible production 
systems of subcontracting rely upon close communication, 
reliability, trust, and precise timing. 
Cooke (1988) lists specific criteria for an industry 
to be flexibly integrated: 
internal integration of marketing, production, and 
R & D and the integration of product and process 
innovation; the use of flexible machines; the 
pursuit of economies of scope, internally, by 
multiple production, and externally, via strategic 
alliances; diagonally integrated interfirm 
relationships, wherein specialized production 
takes plac e in-house and routine production is 
subcontrac ted; an occupational structure on a 
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multiskilled group of engineers and nonspecialist 
workers in a core (i.e. functional flexibility) 
augmented by a casual, (numerically flexible) 
peripheral, workforce. 
Donaghu and Barff assert that with the exception of the 
second criterion, Nike closely coincides with Cooke's 
definition. They also observe however, that if they take 
Schoenberger's point that not every factor in a production 
system must convert to a new and discernible form, then Nike 
could be perceived as flexible. But if the move to 
flexibility is a process in which the core of the 
transformation is in the workplace, then Nike's industrial 
organization cannot be thought of as flexible. 
In conclusion, Nike is fundamentally different from the 
mass production firms of the past. Nike is demand-driven, 
while mass production firms under Fordism were supply-
driven. But Nike cannot be characterized as flexibly 
specialized. 
Sayer (1988) a rgues regardless of the state of mass 
production in the West, it is still widely in use in Japan. 
Sayer takes on two main themes: first, he questions the 
concepts of fordism and the crisis of fordism on which the 
debate about postfordism centers. Second, he addresses the 
issue of how Japan's apparently rigid industrial 
organization gives it significant advantages over less 
organized western capital. 
He dispute s that fordism is the cause of capitalism's 
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cri~is. Further, he doubts some of the alleged limitations 
of mass production. He does not see fordism as inevitably 
causing worsening conditions for workers, and this in turn 
generating poor labor relations. 
With regard to the Japanese experience, Sayer observes 
that some of the tendencies resemble those of flexible 
specialization, while others overtly contradict it. Sayer 
points to the rigidities of the Japanese system, which 
include obligated trading relationships, lifetime 
employment, and seniority based payment schemes, all of 
which stand in stark contradiction to a seemingly flexible 
system. Sayer argues that while some components of Japanese 
industry do have flexible traits (eg lifetime employment, 
but regular job shifting within the company), they also have 
many inflexible traits that seriously contradict the 
flexible specialization theory. He also calls into 
question: 
the central contrast between the alleged decline 
of mass production and the rise of small-batch 
production, and the implicit associations between 
vertical integration and mass production. (Sayer, 
1988) 
Sayer concludes that superior economic performance by 
the Japanese and Germans over the United States and Britain 
has less to do with the choice of flexible specialization 
above mass production and more to do with broader 
environmental characteristics that cut across labor 
processes and production scale distinctions. 
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Markusen (1991) attempts to answer two basic questions: 
how did the technologies so key to the new regimes and to 
flexible specialization come to be in the first place, and 
why do particular places become the loci of new spatial 
industrial complexes built around these technologies. 
Markusen notes that there is increasing evidence that 
elite, white male jobs are the only ones prospering under 
the new emerging system, .but little has improved for 
average workers, who is just as impacted by economic 
restructuring. 
Markusen contends that so long as the literature 
continues to highlight the cases that have triumphed over 
others without asking the question why this has occurred, 
little will be learnt, and other locations attempting to 
replicate the experience of the success stories will be 
unable to do so. Further, Markusen asserts that so long as 
the State is excluded from the analysis, no acceptable 
interpretation of technological evolution or the emergence 
of new industrial spaces can be constructed. 
Markusen argues that such areas as Route 128 in 
Massachusetts and Silicon Valley in California are new 
industrial districts, but the reason for this is not because 
they are natural "windows of opportunity", or the result of 
some "exogenous technological leap". Rather, they are a 
result of State sponsorship of particular industries and 
technologies in the pursuit of the Cold War and its military 
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objectives. She believes these new industrial districts 
cannot continue to grow based on their own endogenous growth 
through economies of scope, vertical disintegration and what 
she calls "networks of cooperative innovation." Markusen 
believes their future rests in the hands of the State, and 
its decisions that affect where monies for R & D are 
located. 
Gertler (1988) views the claim that we are experiencing 
a fundamental break from the past with skepticism. He 
argues that flexible technologies have been with us since 
the industrial revolution. He offers the example of the 
screwdriver, which can be viewed as a fixed piece of capital 
and that is infinitely flexible in its range of 
applications. The difference between this basic type of 
flexible machinery and what we know today as flexible is 
that in the old flexibility humans had to operate and 
continually monitor the machine. 
Gertler (1988) observes that Hirschhorn (1984), Noble 
(1984), and Ayres (1986) all verify the early origins of 
numerical control and computerized numerical control 
technology dating back to the beginning of the Fordist era. 
Their work suggests it is more appropriate to view today's 
flexible technologies as the result of a long, uninterrupted 
chain of innovations rather than a clean break with the 
past, despite improvements over earlier versions. He 
further argues that some of the motivations that have led to 
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the adoption of flexible systems are not new, but actually 
date back to the beginning of organized production. 
Amin (1989) is also skeptical as to the validity of the 
flexible specialization theory. He points to the lack of 
attention paid to the widespread usage of batch and craft 
production under the Fordist regime. Amin also notes 
Williams et al (1987:405-439) point out that mass producers 
have been able to adapt to cope with greater consumer demand 
for differentiated goods. Amin goes on to quote Solo (1985) 
who observes that: 
No matter how flexible specialization is, it 
cannot wriggle out from the descending force of a 
decline in aggregate demand ... Nor would future 
uncertainty be less debilitating for the flexible 
specialization technology than for that of mass 
production. 
Amin highlights, as have others, the evidence of little 
job and wage security, poor pay, and reduced formal 
protection of basic rights. He also argues that Sabel 
underplays the existence of differences in the 
characteristics and origins of various contemporary 
industrial districts, such as the key importance of large 
retailers and subcontractors as key actors in some areas, 
small firm networks in other areas, or even government 
expenditure especially in the defense sector, elsewhere 
(Amin et al 1986; Markusen 1991). 
The main thrust of Amin's paper is an analysis of 
whether firms in the ''Third Italy" are flexible. As a 
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result of his analysis he concludes there are severe 
problems with the flexibility thesis as defined by Piore and 
Sabel. He notes that in the "Third Italy": 
very few, and only the oldest of the industrial 
districts come close to resembling the "ideal 
type". The organizational structure in these 
areas appears to be changing, with new forces 
favoring industrial concentration emerging. 
Despite what Piore and Sabel claim to have found , 
some of the key elements of the successful 
industrial district are highly place specific. 
Flexible Specialization and the Textile Industry 
Piore and Sabel use the textile industry in what has 
the "Third Italy" as one of their key examples of the 
reemergence of craft principles, which led them to 
hypothesize about the emergence of flexible specialization 
on a more universal scale. Because much of the flexibility 
argument was based on the assertion that the phenomenon was 
occurring in the industrial districts in Italy, writers have 
returned to take a second look · at the Third Italy. 
Amin (1989) examined the Third Italy in light of the 
claims made by Piore and Sable (1984). He observes the rise 
in the number of small firms located in the region, 
observing the consensus that the initial rise in this number 
came about as a result of the extensive use of 
subcontracting by both medium and large firms in the area. 
The combined growth of this sector, however, was attributed 
to the small firms ability to free themselves of the 
subcontracting relationships and sell specialist goods and 
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services in the market and to other specialist buyers. 
Amin notes that official statistics show a poorer level 
of innovation among small firms than their larger 
counterparts. They also show, conversely, that this lower 
innovative level does not translate into lower profits. 
Smaller firms experienced lower wages and longer 
working hours, with lack of industry regulation to establish 
minimum working standards. 
Amin argues that it may well be true that the classic 
portrayal of the flexibly specialized district exists only 
in the industrial district of Italy that Piore and Sabel 
originally used to support their theory. Textile production 
in Prato may be flexibly specialized in the Third Italy, and 
it works there. However, one cannot, it seems, take that 
argument with the unique set of conditions found in the 
Third Italy and apply it universally to textiles or any 
other industry. 
A consensus of opinion has not yet emerged from the 
flexibility debate. This chapter has highlighted the main 
areas of discussion in the debate. The current literature 
is not comprehensive in addressing all dimensions of 
flexible specialization. In particular, the debate has not 
thoroughly addressed aspects of flexibility which apply to 
the textile finishing industry. Walker (1990) has begun to 
address aspects of the flexibility debate that are 
applicable to the textile finishing industry, but the 
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argument has not yet been developed far enough. This 




One of the major problems with prior studies of 
flexible production is that they overwhelmingly rely on case 
studies, but little, if any systematic selection process was 
used to pick the industry. This study however, came about 
as the result of a systematic selection process. 
In the first phase of the project, national data were 
analyzed to identify industries in which flexibility and 
vertical disintegration seemed to be increasing. The data 
for this procedure came from the U.S. Small Business 
Administration's Small Business Data Base (SBDB) for the 
years 1976-1984. These data were used to construct the 
following indicators: 
* The number of specialist independent 
establishments2 
* Employment per establishment 
* Total employment 
* National firms as a proportion of all firms 3 
Changes in these indicators over the years 1976-1984 
were also computed using a regression-residential approach 
2 An establishment is considered "independent" if it is the 
only establishment in its firm; a "specialist" is a firm whose 
parent enterprise does business in a single 4-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) category. 
3 A national firm is a firm with branches in two or more 
regions of the country. 
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(Miller; Feldman, 1990). 
The combination of these indicators identified which 
industries (analyzed at the four-digit SI C code l e vel) 
appeared to be e xperiencing trends that implied increasing 
vertical disintegration and fle x ibility . 
Based on analysis these indicators, textile finishing, 
aircraft parts, and medical and surgical instruments were 
selected for in-depth study. 
The next phase encompassed the use of secondary sources 
on the industry, face-to-face interviews with firms in the 
industry, and a mail survey. 4 Secondary sources consulted 
included the Census of Manufactures, The Directory of New 
England Manufacturers, Standard and Poor's Industry Surveys, 
County Business Patterns, technical texts describing the 
process of textile finishing, and academic literature on the 
industry. Interviews were conducted at three Rhode Island 
textile finishing firms using a predetermined format. The 
firms were asked questions pertaining to the company's 
history, production process, location, employees, 
customer/supplier relations, and perceptions of the future 
of the industry and the impact of importi on the industry. 
The final phase of the project involved use of the data 
and information collected to provide a detailed analysis of 
the industry. This information will be used to check the 
validity of the original estimates of national trends. 
4 The Survey is not yet completed as of this date. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HISTORY OF THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY 
Several driving forces made New England the original 
location for textile manufacturing in the United States. 
Burgy (1932:4) observes that the cotton-mill landscape 
reflects the stream network and the coastal bounds of the 
region, geographical determinants which operated in a more 
or less contemporaneous fashion as the industry developed. 
The necessity of water power for the successful operation of 
Arkwright machinery, such as Slater designed and used in his 
first mill on the banks of the Blackstone River in Rhode 
Island, limited the earliest mills to vantage points on 
stream courses. This explains the general mill distribution 
and the individual mill clusters up to 1850. 
The Transition to Mechanization 
During the colonial period, the textile industry 
remained essentially a craft industry. The transition to 
mechanization began in 1790, when the firm of Almy and 
Brown, tapping into the technical innovations of Samuel 
Slater, spun cotton yarn with water-powered machinery. This 
led to the factory system of production being introduced. 
Kennedy (1936) observes that from 1790, when Samuel Slater 
built at Pawtucket, Rhode Island, the first spinning 
machinery utilizing water power along the lines of 
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Arkwright's machines, to 1804, only sixteen cotton mills had 
been established in the United States. By 1810 this number 
had increased to 269, with 87,000 spindles, and by 1815 the 
number of spindles had been increased to 130,000. 
The transition to power-driven machinery was almost 
complete by 1830, when all but two processes in cloth 
manufacturing were mechanized. From 1830 up to the Civil 
War, the New England textile industry grew, and enjoyed 
almost unchallenged domestic prosperity. Kennedy points out 
that the most significant event during this period in the 
textile industry was the organization of the Boston 
Manufacturing Company at Waltham, Massachusetts. This 
company was formed under the stimulus of the Civil War 
(Gordon et al, 1982). As Kennedy observes, the launching of 
this mill was, in many ways, to shape the course of how the 
industry would develop in at least four respects. According 
to Kennedy these were: the integration of power-driven 
spinning and weaving machinery within the same plant 
(spatial integration) , the f.inancing of a large-scale 
enterprise by the formation of a joint stock company and the 
sale of common stock, the employment of an independent 
selling house to distribute the product of the mill, and 
establishment of a separate textile machine industry. The 
Waltham system differed from the Rhode Island system. Under 
the Rhode Island structure, integration ran throughout the 
process from spinning machines to spinning to financing. 
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Weaving machines, weaving and finance were also integrated 
with distribution. This stands in contrast to the Waltham 
situation where spinning and weaving machines were 
disintegrated from spinning and weaving operations. The 
distribution process was also disintegrated. Financing 
under the Waltham system was partially disintegrated. 
Up to 1850, labor for the mills came predominantly from 
New England farms. Mill owners lured farmers and their 
children, notably their daughters, into the mills, but many 
returned to farming after they had earned enough money to 
buy land. This was the case with much of the mill workforce 
around Lowell, Massachusetts, this being the single most 
important town in firms of textiles, in the country, meaning 
that there was no permanent mill population north of Boston. 
In terms of the accommodations that mill workers 
occupied, it was a common practice in towns with less than 
10,000 persons to find that the mill company would own a 
sizeable amount of the housing stock within the town. In 
1924, for example, 62 out of 187 of the cotton-textile 
concerns in Massachusetts owned or controlled company houses 
(Burgy, 1932:153). However, this tendency was to change 
with improved transportation facilities in the form of 
better roads and automobiles, making for an increase in the 
independence and mobility of the mill worker. This factor 
led to a change in the relationship between management and 
worker due to the decreased reliance on the part of the 
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worker on management for housing. 
The invention of the Draper automatic loom in 1895 and 
its distribution after 1900 had a very profound impact on 
the direction that the industry took for the following half 
century. Named after its inventor, this piece of machinery 
allowed for the changing of the bobbin without stopping the 
loom, the shuttle being refilled automatically with a fresh 
bobbin from a magazine on one side of the loom (Kennedy, 
1936:8). Development of the Draper loom coincided with a 
period of "easy" money in the financial markets, as interest 
in industrial promotions intensified. The result of this 
coincidence was the greatest expansion of the textile 
industry in its history, driven mainly by the prospect of 
higher profits in companies equipped with the Draper loom. 
Despite this rise in the desire to invest in textile 
companies due to rising profits from technical innovation, 
relative to other industrial ventures, textiles remained 
relatively unimportant, in terms of investment, because of 
the small size of the majority of the firms within the 
industry. Kennedy notes that as a result of this, it 
(textiles) was unable to command attention for its 
securities in the principal capital markets of the country. 
Although this situation was a hindrance to widespread 
ownership of securities, it did not prevent the flow of 
capital into the industry, through stocks, which for years 
had been well known for it's earnings. It was under such 
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conditions that the two large cotton mill consolidations of 
the trust era were formed, the duck merger, originally known 
as the Mount Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Company, and later 
as the Consolidated Cotton Duck Company, and the New England 
Cotton Yarn Company (Kennedy, 1936:12). 
In 1913, Lockwood Greene and Company, a firm of textile 
engineers that was undertaking much of the building of new 
mills at the time, took over management of the discredited 
cotton duck merger to undertake the reorganization of the 
company and run the mills. At the time this company was 
known as the International Cotton Mills (New York), and was 
the outcome of several successive reorganizations of what, 
in 1899, when first formed, was known as the Mount Vernon-
Woodberry Cotton Duck Company. The original consolidation 
had been undertaken at the height of the trust forming era 
by an organization of promoters who anticipated making large 
profits from the formation of a monopoly of mills producing 
cotton duck and related fabrics and the resulting sales of 
securities from the company. For a short period the 
consolidated company undertook to buy out its competitors, 
but this led it into financial problems which, despite 
several attempts at reorganization, grew worse. This was 
when Lockwood Greene stepped in to take over the ailing 
firm. For its part in the reorganization of the firm, 
Lockwood Greene received a controlling stock interest in the 
International Company. 
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In part due to the partial failure of these moves to 
merge firms within the industry, further moves to 
consolidate the industry did not occur. The industry thus 
continued to operate under a highly decentralized 
organizational structure. 
Consolidation of textile firms into few large 
companies, although beginning during the first half of the 
twentieth century, did not happen as early, or often as in 
other industries in the U.S.A. Kennedy (1936) describes the 
mergers that did occur and the motivation for them. For 
example, he describes the type of control that was 
exemplified by the Lockwood Greene holding company's control 
through ownership of controlling stock interest. Another 
type was that of Consolidated Textile Corporation, which 
foresaw the complete acquisition of new mills. Mill 
companies increasingly realized the benefits of economies of 
scale through mergers, either horizontally or vertically. 
The Shift of Textiles to the South 
The center of gravity of U.S. cotton textile production 
shifted from the Northeast to the South between 1880 and 
1930. Up until 1880, New England textile firms enjoyed 
national prominence. Value of product for the northern 
states declined from 1880 on relative to the South. In 
1880, the value of product for the North was $130,936,232, 
while for the same year in the South the value of product 
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was $13,315,840. By 1930 the value of product for the 
northern states was $368,672,202, while that of the South 
had risen to $873,623,564, a dramatic increase relative to 
that of the north (See Table 1). Much of this change can be 
attributed to the shift of the textile industry to the 
South. The predominant advantage the South had was cheaper 
wages. In addition, factors such as lower taxes and cheaper 
fuel also helped in the process of luring away textile firms 
to the South. 
Labor proved to be a more significant portion of the 
total manufacturing cost in New England than in the South. 
For example, in 1927, wages constituted 22.6 percent of 
value for fabrics produced in New England, but only 21.5 
percent in the rest of the country. Further, the average 
annual wage paid to an operative in New England in 1927 was 
$944.00, while elsewhere this was only $724.00 (Burgy, 
1932:145) One of the main reasons why wages were higher in 
the North was that the region was unionized, whereas in the 
South there was little, if any organized labor. 
At the beginning of the emergence of the South, lack of 
skilled workers was a major inhibiting force. Wright 
(1981:605-629) ties growth of textile production in the 
South to the development of a skilled mill labor force 
between 1880 and 1930. The South began to infringe on the 
North gradually at first only in the production of coarse 
cloth types, which required little skill to produce. As 
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skill levels rose, the South started to infringe on segments 
of the textile industry in which cloth was of a more high 
grade quality. Southern workers initially achieved 
competency only in the simplest tasks because most of them 
came from rural areas and had little experience with the 
factory system. Wright further asserts that Southern 
workers were less productive than Northern workers before 
1930. 
In addition to a shortage of skilled labor, Kane 
(1988:13) argues an insufficient supply of capital inhibited 
the building of mills in the South. Davis (1971) argues 
that barriers to capital mobility hindered the interregional 
flow of financial capital from the North to the capital 
scarce South. It was the second decade of the twentieth 
century before southern textiles clearly dominated the 
American market a domination that would almost certainly 
have been achieved a hundred years earlier had capital been 
more mobile. 
Thus, after 1930 the textile industry in New England 
increasingly struggled to compete with the South. Added to 
this, a new competitor emerged on the scene beginning in the 
late 1960s and 1970s. 
The Textile Industry Today 
The entrance of the developing nations into the arena 
of competition in manufacturing added mounting pressure to 
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New. England textile firms trying to find a lifeline in an 
increasingly hostile market. 
In addition, demand began to stagnate. Since the 1970s 
demand in the United States has grown at the rate of less 
than one percent annually. The two forces increased 
competition and squeezed profits. The response has been to 
attempt to raise labor productivity by investing in 
automated machinery. There has also been a rise in mergers 
as firms scramble to gain economies of scale and scope. 
The major response has been to move into specialty 
products. Firms in New England have sought to use existing 
machinery and technology combined in such a way as to yield 
them an advantage over the competition. 
The growth of textile imports has had a profound effect 
on the textile industry as a whole. The trade deficit in 
textiles has risen dramatically in recent years. Net 
imports jumped to almost $1 billion in 1983 and increased to 
$2.5 billion in 1986 (See Table 2). This has been a growing 
trend from 1980 on (Kane, 1988:141). 
Although the import share for textiles is not large 
relative to manufacturing as a whole, that share is rising. 
The strong dollar during the early 1980s did not help this 
situation, but in the latter part of the 1980s the dollar 
weakened considerably. Still, textile imports have not been 
significantly affected by the fluctuating value of the 
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proportion of textile imports come from have currencies 
pegged to the dollar. Increasingly, these countries are 
seeking out the U.S. market because those of Japan and the 
European Economic Community are more protected than the 
relatively open markets of the United States (Kane, 
1988: 142) . 
Since 1973, the U.S. textile industry has been formally 
protected from foreign competition by the Multi-Fiber 
Agreement (MFA) . This was renewed for a fourth time in 1986 
for five years. The agreement defines a framework in which 
the fifty-one countries belonging to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) can set textile import controls. 
Textile production has followed a recurrent pattern 
since the British textile mills lost their dominance in the 
nineteenth century. The center of textile manufacturing has 
continued to shift from the industrialized countries to the 
developing nations and regions, where wages are low. 
Britain in the nineteenth century lost out to New England, 
which in turn lost to the South, and today the South is 
losing to the developing nations of Asia. 
The textile industry in New England continues to be 
battered by imports. Yet the New England firms are not 
blind to the need to change to regain market share. They 
are constrained in many ways, however. For example, to 
purchase new technologically advanced machinery is too 
e xpensive. The response appears to be the emergence of 
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innovative new uses of old machinery to gain advantage over 
imports. Whether this response will be enough to prevent 




THE PRODUCTION PROCESS TODAY 
This chapter looks at textile finishing as distinct 
from textiles as a whole. Stout defines fabric finishing 
as: 
those processes that fabric undergoes after it is 
fabricated by weaving, knitting, felting, or other 
methods in preparation for use by garment 
manufacturers or, in some instances, directly by 
the ultimate consumers ... Finishing becomes ever 
more complicated with the appearance of new 
fibers, new finishing processes and chemical 
compounds, and new ways of combining fibers into 
fabrics (Stout, 1970:329). 
In 1970, when Stout was writing, firms tended to 
include both the finishing process and the actual making of 
cloth. Stout goes on to note that despite this trend toward 
integration, in many large textile mills a large proportion 
of fabrics are still finished in mills other than the one 
where they are fabricated. Mills whose function is 
finishing are called converting mills, and persons who work 
there are known as convertors. 
Fabrics as they come from the looms to the finishers 
are known as gray goods. This term has grown with increased 
usage to include any unfinished fabric and not just a fabric 
in need of bleaching. One would not except to find a gray 
good sold as the finished form, e x cept perhaps in the case 
of industrial usage. 
Stout provides a detailed list of five reasons for 
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performing the task of finishing: to improve aesthetic 
qualities; to impart specific functional properties not 
inherent in fiber or fabric; to improve easy-care 
characteristics; to improve durability by improving certain 
service qualities; and to permit adaptation of present 
fabric constructions to changing market needs. 
Fa.bric Finishing Processes 
Fabric-finishing processes are categorized in 
different ways. These include: physical and chemical, wet 
and dry, for appearance and for function, and temporary and 
permanent. Stout (1970:331) divides finishes into three 
groups. These are: 
general processes used for many fabrics to improve 
appearance, serviceability, or both; processes 
designed primarily to change appearance or surface 
texture, and for which any change in function or 
serviceability is largely incidental; and 
processes designed to give special functional or 
serviceability properties not inherent in the 
fiber or fabric, and in which any change of 
appearance is incidental. 
Finishing processes used for many fabrics include 
cleaning, bleaching, drying, shrinkage control, heat-
setting, inspection, repair, singeing, shearing, brushing, 
softening, sizing, weighting and fulling, tentering, dyeing, 
and mercerizing. 
Cleaning encompasses all methods by which waxes, 
pectins, soil, lubricants, warp sizing, and other alien 
substances still left on the fibers, are removed in 
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preparation for other finishing processes. The process also 
includes any final cleaning of the fabric before it goes t o 
the consumer. The cleaning process includes scouring and 
washing with soap and water, dry cleaning, and enzyme 
treatment for removal of sizing, starches etc. 
Bleaching is a chemical process that removes the color 
from the cloth by the use of chlorine or sodium compounds, 
or by the use of hydrogen perox ide. The bleaching process 
is used on natural fibers to even color. Fabrics are then 
dyed or left white depending on color chosen for the final 
product. Cotton is also bleached due to the existence of 
occasional black flecks. Bleaching also performs the 
function of destroying any microorganisms that are present 
in the fabric, and it increases the fabrics absorbency. 
Drying both removes moisture from the cloth and 
eradicates folds, creases and wrinkles. The latter can be 
achieved by pressing, tension, _ or blowing. There are 
several different methods used for drying. Stout offers the 
example of the oldest method of drying which involves the 
use of calendar rolls between which opened-out fabrics are 
passed. 
Shrinkage control is obtained by the use of one of 
three methods. The choice of the method will depend on the 
type of fabric being finished and the use for which the 
fabric is planned. The three methods are heat-setting, 
compressive shrinkage, and stabilization by treatment with 
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thermosetting resins. Heat-setting is the process whereby a 
rearrangement and fixation of the internal molecular 
structure of nylon occurs. Internal stresses in the 
material are relieved and the fibers tend to assume a 
permanent structural arrangement in which they are held 
during the setting treatment. Compressive shrinkage is the 
process whereby the overstretching distortion of fabric 
during weaving or other processing is removed by dampening 
the cloth and drying it in a relaxed condition so as to 
remove tensions or distortions. Thermosetting resins are 
applied in a liquid form. The fabric is pinned or clipped 
to the dimensions needed on tenter frames, and then the 
resin is heat cured. Success of this treatment depends on 
the susceptibility of the fibers to the treatment, the 
amount of resin used in the process, and the subsequent 
processing and care. 
Inspection is the process by which the fabric is 
examined to locate defects, which are then marked for 
repair. The process is carried out with the fabric opened 
up and placed under a light so that any defects can be 
clearly seen. Any repairable imperfections in the fabric 
are also dealt with at this stage. 
Singeing is the process by which fiber, projecting yarn 
ends, and other fuzz is burnt off to leave the fabric with a 
smooth, even surface. The mechanics of this operation 
involve the passing of the fabric over gas flames or hot 
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plates at a speed fast enough so that the fabric itself is 
not burned but any protruding material is removed by 
burning. The fabric is then passed over a wet surface to 
insure the extinguishing o~ any smoldering fibers. 
Shearing is the process of cutting pile to a uniform 
height, or in certain cases, eradicating all fuzz from the 
fabric. Shearing may occur several times for maximum 
evenness. 
Weighting, softening, sizing and fulling, are processes 
for changing the feel of fabrics, to replace waxes, gums, or 
oils lost in finishing, and to increase flexibility and 
drape of the fabric. Weighting is the process by which silk 
is treated with metallic salts to give weight and body to 
the fabric. Lead, zinc, and tin have been used in this 
process, although today lead is no longer used because of 
the health hazards associated with its use. 
Softening is the process by which one or more products 
is added to the fabric to make it softer. Softening agents 
used include dextrin, glycerin, sulfonated oils, waxes, and 
soaps. 
Sizing is a yarn process in preparation for weaving. 
Fulling agents, when applied, have the same effect on wool 
as sizing materials on other fabrics. This effect is used 
as a finishing process on wool products. Some of these 
products are removed from the cloth as a result of wear or 
washing, while others are durable. 
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Tentering, crabbing, and heat-setting are described as: 
the final processes by which warp and filling of 
woven fabrics are set at right angles to each 
other and pulled out to the dimensions at which 
they are to be dried as finished products. 
Crabbing is the term applied to wet-tentering of 
wool; heat-setting is used for most of the 
thermoplastic fibers. Pins or clips grasp the 
selvages and hold the fabric in place as it 
travels through the machine, releasing it at the 
end where it is folded or rolled for packaging 
(Stout, 1970:335). 
The processes described above are the general processes 
used in finishing of most fabrics. Numerous other, more 
specialized finishing processes are also used. 5 
Texti1e Finishing SIC Codes 
The umbrella Standard Industry Classification (SIC) 
code for textiles is 22, and within this there are ten SIC 
codes under the heading of finishing. These are Broadwoven 
Fabric Mills, (SIC 2231); the knitting industries in SIC 225 
involved in finishing (SICs 2251, 2252, 2257, 2258), Cotton 
Finishing Plants, (SIC 2261); Manmade Finishing Plants, (SIC 
2262); N.E.C. (Not Elsewhere Classified) finishing plants, 
(2269); Yarn Spinning Mills, (SIC 2281); and Coated Fabrics, 
Not Rubberized, (SIC 2295) . 
SIC code 2231, Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Wool, is made 
up of establishments primarily engaged in weaving fabrics 
more than 12 inches in width, wholly or chiefly by weight of 
5 For a thorough discussion of more specialized processes, see 
Stout, 1970:337-352. 
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wool, mohair, or similar animal fibers; dyeing and finishing 
all woven wool fabrics or dyeing wool, tops or yarn; and 
those shrinking and sponging wool goods for the trade. The 
SIC code group 225 includes four finishing codes. SIC 2251 
is made up of establishments primarily engaged in knitting, 
dyeing, or finishing women's and misses' full-length and 
knee-length hosiery , both seamless, full-fashion, and panty-
hose. SIC 2252 is comprised of firms engaged in knitting, 
dyeing, or finishing hosiery, not elsewhere classified. SIC 
2257, Weft Knit Fabric Mills is comprised of firms engaged 
in the making of knitting weft knit fabrics or in dyeing, or 
finishing weft knit fabrics. SIC 2258, Lace and Warp Knit 
Fabric Mills, is made of firms engaged in producing 
knitting, dyeing, or finishing warp knit fabrics, or in 
manufacturing, dyeing, or finishing lace goods. SIC 2281, 
Yarn Spinning Mills, is made up of establishments primarily 
engaged in spinning yarn wholly or chiefly by weight of 
cotton, manmade fibers, silk, wool, mohair, or similar 
animal fibers. SIC 2295, Coated Fabrics, Not Rubberized, is 
made up of establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing 
coated, impregnated, or laminated textiles, and in the 
special finishing of textiles, such as varnishing and 
waxing. SIC 2261, the Cotton Finishing Plant industry is 
made up of establishments engaged in finishing purchased 
cotton broadwoven fabrics, or finishing such fabrics on a 
commission basis. This SIC code also includes firms engaged 
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in the shrinking and sponging of cotton fabrics and chemical 
finishing for water repellency, fire resistance, and mildew 
proofing. Industries coded under SIC code 2262, Manmade 
Finishing Plants, are those engaged in finishing purchased 
manmade fiber and silk broadwoven fabrics, or finishing such 
fabrics on a commission basis. Industry classification 
2269, N.E.C. Finishing Plants, is made up of firms engaged 
in dyeing and finishing textiles, not elsewhere classified. 
This includes bleaching, dyeing, printing, and finishing of 
raw stock, yarn, braided goods, and narrow fabrics (except 
wool and knit fabrics) (Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census, 1987) . 6 
Total Employment Within Textile Finishing 
Total employment in textile finishing has declined 
since 1972. Total employment for the sector, as defined by 
the ten SIC codes, declined from 1972 through 1982. After 
1982 the industry rallied to regain lost ground, but still 
did not begin to approach anywhere near the level of its 
1972 employment. From 1972 to 1977 employment fell 16.7 
percent, from 389.8 thousand to 333.9 thousand. From 1977 
6 In terms of the way in which the Census of Manufactures has 
reported the statistics used in this chapter, the statistics, 
including figures for employment, payroll, etc are reported for 
each establishment as a whole. Aggregates of such data for an 
industry reflect not only the primary activities of the 
establishments, but also their activities in the manufacture of 
secondary products as well as their miscellaneous activities, 
including each firm's activities as contract work on materials 
owned by others and such work as repairs. 
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to 1982 employment decreased by another 22.3 percent, from 
333.9 thousand workers to 273.1 thousand. From 1 982 t o 1 987 
employment in the industry rose from 273.1 thousand to 290 . 7 
thousand, an increase of 6.1 percent (See Table 3 ). 
Further, the textile industry lost out in terms o f the 
percentage employed within total manufacturing. This share 
fell from 2.05 percent of total manufacturing in 197 2 , to 
1.54 percent o f to t al manufacturing in 1987 (See Table 3 ). 
SIC code 223 1, broadwoven fabric mills, wool, has seen 
a significant decline in numbers employed. Employment fell 
from 19.4 thousand in 1972 to 13.1 thousand in 1982. 1 987 
saw a slight recovery from the 1982 low point to 13.8 
thousand. 
SIC code 2251 saw a long-term fall in numbers employed 
from a 1972 figure of 49.5 thousand to 29.3 thousand in 
1987. 
In SIC code 2252 an increase occurred in workers 
employed. The figure rose from 32.6 thousand in 1972 to a 
high of 3 6.5 thousand in 1987. 
SIC code 2257 saw a sharp decline in numbers employed 
from 1972 to 1 987. The figure of employed persons fell from 
68.1 thousand i n 1972 to 34.9 thousand in 1987. 
SIC code 2258 saw an initial increase in employment 
from 1972 t o 197 7, but thereafter a decline set in. The 
number of workers rose from 24.9 thousand in 1972 to 25. 9 
thousand i n 1977 . The fall occurred from 1977 through 1 987 
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TABLE 3 
TOTAL TEXTILE FINISHING EMPLOYMENT 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT 
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when the numbers employed fell from 25.9 thousand to 20.5 
thousand. 
SIC code 22 61, cotton finishing plants, declined 
consistently from 1972 through 1982, but then appeared to 
recover slightly in 1987. Total employment in SIC code 2261 
in 1972 was 25.7 thousand, but by 1982 this figure had 
fallen to 11.6 thousand, with a recovery to 16.6 thousand in 
1987. 
SIC code 22 62, manmade finishing plants, saw an 
increase from 1972 to 1977. However, after the 1977 
increase the SIC code experienced a steady decrease. In 
1972 SIC code 2262 employed 35.2 thousand workers. By 1977 
this figure had risen to 37.2 thousand. The employment 
figure declined from this 1977 level to 27.9 thousand in 
1987. 
In SIC code 2269, N.E.C. finishing plants, employment 
fell in 2269 from 1972 through 1982, with a small decrease 
between 1982 and 1987. In 1972 the total employment in SIC 
Code 2269 was 18.5 thousand. This fell to 12.0 thousand by 
1982. By 1987 employment had decreased employment to 11.8 
thousand. 
In SIC code 2281, total employment fell from 97.9 
thousand in 1972 to 76 thousand in 1982. It recovered in 
1987 to 89.1 thousand persons employed. 
SIC code 2295 has steadily lost jobs since 1972 when 
the numbers employed were 18 thousand. By 1987 this number 
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had . fallen to only 10.3 thousand workers (See Table 4). 
One might speculate that with the recession of 1991, 
and the manufacturing sector being hard hit, figures for the 
















TOTAL EMPLOYMENT BY SIC CODE 
FOR 1972-1987 (THOUSANDS) 
1972 1977 1982 
19.4 14.6 13.1 
49.5 26.6 30.2 
32.6 32.2 32.6 
68.1 51. 8 31.1 
24.9 25.9 21.1 
25.7 20.8 11. 6 
35.2 37.2 34.4 
18.5 14.1 12.0 
97.9 97.1 76.0 
18.0 13.6 11. 0 
389.8 333.9 273.1 
















This chapter profiles industrial organization in 
textile finishing. 
Overview 
The textile industry as a whole is suffering from 
import pressures, rising raw materials prices, and 
stagnating demand, and this has significant implications for 
textile finishing. When unfinished textile goods work their 
way down the line to the finishing stage, they too are 
confronted with reduced volume, higher prices passed on as 
a result of rising raw materials prices, and less work due 
to a rising share of the domestic market being held by 
cheaper foreign imports (See Table 5) . 
Employment Trends in the Textile Industry 
The national figures for total employment in textile 
finishing presented in Chapter 4 (Table 4) highlight a 
decline in employment in the industry up to 1982 and then a 
recovery between 1982 and 1987. By 1989 the textile 
industry as a whole had recovered somewhat, from the 1988 
fall that had adversely affected earnings. 7 Profitability 
7 Standard and Poors (1990) discusses profitability in the 
entire textile indus t ry (SIC 22). Data on profitability in textile 
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has risen since the beginning of the 1980s, when as a 
response to stiff competition from overseas, and a deep 
recession, the industry began to restructure. The 
restructuring included closings of numerous plants and 
laying off large numbers of workers. Capital e xpenditures 
on advanced technology, automated manufacturing systems and 
automated machinery have increased the domestic industry's 
competitive position. Reduction in the value of the dollar 
has also helped make U.S. products more competitive on the 
world market, helping to offset some of the cost advantages 
of foreign textiles. 
The weakening dollar, however, does not tell the whole 
story. By the end of 1989, the Commerce Department's index 
of new orders was down 10.5% from the corresponding period 
of 1988; and as of the end of February 1990, the new order 
rate stood 9.9% below the year-earlier level. The rate of 
unfilled orders was also not encouraging. At year-end 1989, 
unfilled orders were just 0.4 % ahead of the same period of 
1988. As new orders have softened, the unfilled order rate 
has headed south, and as of February 1990 it was 6.1% lower 
than the previous year. Textile profits are expected to be 
hurt by the slower volume, raw materials prices, and renewed 
competitive pressure from imports ( Standard and Poors, 
1990: 51 7-780). 
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Restructuring 
The U.S. textile industry, as with most manufacturing 
industries, was hard-hit by the recession of the early 1980s 
and the one beginning in 1990. With restructuring, there 
has been a trend toward consolidation. Standard and Poors 
notes that of the fifteen largest publicly-traded textile 
companies ten years ago, only three remain, all a result of 
consolidation activity (Standard and Poors, 1990:517-780) 
Several factors underlie this restructuring and 
consolidation process. Competition from foreign imports is 
a key factor. Standard and Poors (1990:517-780) observes 
that while: 
disposable personal income has increased an 
average of 9.7% annually since 1980, sales of U.S. 
textile mill products increased only 1.9% annually 
during that period. Failing to reap the implied 
benefits of growth in consumer spending, the 
industry turned to acquisitions (in textiles) to 
achieve that growth. 
The trend toward consolidation has also been spurred by 
a desire on the part of certain companies to become market 
leaders in core businesses. This allows firms to increase 
their shares of existing markets, and to acquire shares of 
new markets. Through consolidation firms also achieve 
economies of scale and scope. 
Imports 
The import threat has been one of the major forces that 
has led to the rising number of acquisitions. Standard and 
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Poors observes that between 1980 and 1989, imports of y arn, 
fabric, and miscellaneous textiles (excluding apparel) grew 
to 6,077.5 million square yards, from 2,000.2 million square 
yards. In 1989, total tex tile imports, as measured in 
millions of square yards, grew 12.7 %, with textile imports 
up 11.2 %, and apparel up 14.2 %. Imports have consisted 
primarily of short-run fabrics, labor intensive fabrics, and 
apparel products. This implies the thesis about increases 
in short runs is correct. 
Domestic textile producers are placing less emphasis on 
segments of the industry that compete directly with imports 
and have looked to areas of the industry in which they can 
produce at a relatively low cost and where import 
penetration is less likely. 
Domestic firms have also moved to enter "niche-
oriented" high-margin areas. Standard and Poors gives the 
example of Guildford Mills pioneering specializing fabric 
finishing techniques that were unavailable elsewhere. 
By eliminating unprofitable plants and through massive 
layoffs the industry has managed to increase productivity. 
Older machines have been replaced with new automated 
machinery, and capacity has grown. According to Standard 
and Poors (1990:517-780), despite a 15 % decline in 
employment, production in the industry increased by 24% 
between 1980 and 1989. 
Most new investment by the industry is e xpected to be 
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to enhance productivity, rather than increase capacity. 
Standard and Poors observes that textile industry 
earnings as a percentage of sales have varied widely. This 
is very much a reflection of the tendency for variation in 
manufacturing as a whole, although textile earnings are 
generally seen to cover a wider range. 
Despite improved productivity and profitability, profit 
margins within the industry remain low. In 1988 and 1989, 
for example, net profits for all manufacturing companies 
were 5.9% and 5.0%, but in textiles were 3.1% and 2.5%, 
respectively (Standard and Poors:1990). 
In addition to modernizing operations and reducing the 
size of the workforce while increasing productivity, textile 
firms have attempted a series of profit-enhancing 
activities. They have also sought to achieve greater asset 
management and to increase inventory turnover. However, 
such factors as high real interest rates worked against the 
industry in the 1980s. 
Textile Wages 
Wages in the textile industry are lower than the wages 
for all manufacturing. However, since 1985 the gap has 
narrowed somewhat. In 1980, average textile wages per week 
were 70.27 percent of all manufacturing wages. In 1985 this 
percentage fell to 68.84 percent, but by 1989 the percent 
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Union membership has declined in Clothing and Textile 
Workers union from 440,000 members in 1971 to 228,000 
members in 1985. This decline is in line with the national 
reduction in total union membership in all trades. 
Number of Establishments 
Table 7 breaks down number of establishments by state, 
and SIC code. Massachusetts consistently has the most 
establishments although, the state also has the largest 
population in New England. Even though firms employ over 20 
persons than employ below twenty persons, the average size 
of finishing firms is small. 
State of the Industry 
The discussion above provides a picture of an industry 
struggling to survive in the new global economy. The 
industry has restructured since imports began to have a 
strong impact in the beginning of the 1980s. However, 
despite discarding inefficient mills, laying off workers, 
and adopting automated machinery, the industry continues to 
struggle to survive. 
The industry's strategy has been to invest in increased 
productivity, rather than increased capacity. This choice 
makes sense in the current economic climate, as demand is 
stagnant. Despite reductions in the workforce, the 
industry continues to be less profitable than manufacturing 
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TABLE 7 
TOTAL NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS IN NEW ENGLAND TEXTILE FINISHING 
SIC CODES WITH NUMBERS SHOWN FOR THOSE ESTABLISHMENTS EMPLOYING 
TWENTY OR MORE PERSONS 
SIC CODE 
2231 2251 2252 2257 2258 2261 2262 2269 2281 2295 
CONNECTICUT 
TOTAL ESTABS 4 0 0 0 6 4 7 0 0 7 
TOTAL ESTABS 2 0 0 0 4 3 5 0 0 5 
WITH 20+ 
MAINE 
TOTAL ES TABS 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 
TOTAL ESTABS 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 
WITH 20+ 
MASSACHUSETTS 
TOTAL ESTABS 16 0 0 6 0 12 16 7 11 18 
TOTAL ESTABS 9 0 0 5 0 8 14 3 7 10 
WITH 20+ 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
TOTAL ESTABS 6 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL ESTABS 4 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 
WITH 20+ 
RHODE ISLAND 
TOTAL ES TABS 10 0 0 8 17 9 5 5 0 3 
TOTAL ESTABS 8 0 0 3 12 5 4 2 0 2 
WITH 20+ 
VERMONT 
TOTAL ESTABS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 
TOTAL ESTABS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
WITH 20+ 
SOURCE: U.S. CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES, 1987 
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as a whole. 
U.S. firms have chosen to retreat to segments of the 
industry where they can compete with imports. This has led 
to high-tech segments of the industry, a strategy that works 
because the developing nations do not have similar 
technological abilities. The problem with this approach is 
that eventually the developing nations may develop 




IS FLEXIBILITY INCREASING IN THE TEXTILE FINISHING 
INDUSTRY IN NEW ENGLAND? 
This chapter addresses the issue of whether there is 
evidence that the textile finishing industry in New England 
is becoming flexibly specialized. An important point to 
note is that the flexibility theory as presented in Chapter 
2, The Flexibility Debate, is still being debated by 
academics and no consensus has yet been reached. 
Criticism of flexible specialization theory as 
advocated by Fiore and Sabel (1984) centers around reliance 
on arbitrarily selected case studies of local areas that are 
then specialized without justification. Amin (1989) argues 
that unique circumstances in the chosen study areas were the 
reason flexible specialization thrived, rather than just 
flexible specialization itself being the cause of the areas' 
success. 8 
As the flexibility debate has developed, some studies 
have found some, although not all, of the attributes of the 
classic definition of flexible specialization are to be 
present; enough indeed to support some of the assertions 
made by the theory, for example, the assertion that Nike is 
8See Fiore, Sabel (1984) for a discussion of industrial 
districts in the Third Italy, particularly the textile industry in 
Prato. Also see Amin (1989) for a comprehensive criticism of 
flexible specialization in industrial districts and a critique of 
the theory's wider applicability.) 
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flexibly integrated (Donaghu and Barff, 1990). 
F1exibility and the Texti1e Finishing in New England 
This chapter argues th~t the textile finishing industry 
in New England shows signs of some of the traits of 
flexibility. However, the industry cannot be called 
flexible in the classic sense of the definition for several 
reasons. 
Organizational Structure 
The organizational structure of textile finishing firms 
in New England is much the same as it was fifty years ago. 
It is characterized by separation of management and shop 
floor workers, little shop floor involvement in company 
policy, performance of only one task per worker, 
uncomfortable working conditions for those on the shop 
floor, and little unionization. The outward appearance of 
the firms is that of textile companies still struggling to 
enter the twentieth century. The spatial location of the 
textile finishing firms in New England is largely a result 
of the · original location of the firms where the industry 
grew up from the late 1700s on. The firms that remain today 
are largely those that survived the move of the textile 
industry to the South, and have managed to withstand import 
competition pressures. Thus the firms location cannot be 
attributed to flexible specialization. 
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Employee Policies 
Many employee policies are still typical of those one 
would expect to find in a manufacturing firm in the 1940s or 
1950s. The workers are given one job to do and only know 
one job, they are unskilled or at best semi-skilled, their 
hours are rigid aside from overtime, and their work for the 
most part requires little thought. 
Machinery 
Much of the machinery that textile finishing firms use 
is not technologically advanced. Rather than purchasing new 
technologically advanced machinery, some of the firms 
interviewed chose to employ workers to maintain the 
machines. 
The Blurring of the Lines Between Mass Production and 
Flexible Specialization 
One must not overlook Gertler's (1988) argument that we 
are not experiencing a dramatic break from the past, but 
that batch production existed under fordism. This point is 
very relevant to the New England textile finishing industry, 
which does not fit neatly into the definition of mass 
production. Some of the traits associated with flexible 
specialization have been have been present for many years. 
For example, many small firms with low and moderate numbers 
of workers e x ist in the industry. 
61 
Walker (1990) argues extensively that the debate is not 
about a dichotomy. The choice is not simply one of whether 
an industry uses flexible specialization or mass production. 
This simplifies a complex reality in which overlaps are 
plentiful. Walker (1990: 62-63) asserts that the source of 
confusion is: 
the misplaced emphasis on scale o f output (length 
of runs) instead of production methods (type of 
machinery) . One may get very long runs out of 
generalized machinery or short runs out of 
dedicated machinery, with corresponding effects on 
overall efficiency of labour and machine use, but 
the principles of mechanical improvement in each 
case are different. 
Walker's argument with regard to dedicated machinery 
raises an important point, but he fails to take the argument 
far enough to emphasize the importance of looking more 
closely at dedicated machinery. Flexibility in much of New 
England's textile finishing industry rests on the firms' 
ability to use old dedicated machinery in flexible ways. 
Flexibility here is achieved by the operatives ability to 
use the machine in subtly different ways to create a 
different fabric or finish. For e xample, at Company Y, this 
type of flexibility was demonstrated by the machine 
operatives' ability to use the same machine to achieve 
widely varying dyes on fabrics. 
Currently there is no well developed literature or 
·theory to e xplain the form of fle x ibility which seems to be 
occurring in the New England textile industry. 
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Texti1e Finishing in New Eng1and 
The textile finishing industry in New England has 
recognized the inevitability of large sections of the 
textile business being taken over by cheap foreign imports. 
In many cases (usually in the cases of those who have 
survived) the industry's way of dealing with this threat has 
been to retreat into niche-oriented production areas, where 
superior use of finishing processes has allowed domestic 
firms a winning advantage over imports. It is important to 
note that the niche-strategy is a defensive strategy rather 
than an offensive one. 
This realization however does not seem to have stemmed 
the decline in employment in the industry. There has been a 
deliberate policy to increase productivity. The emphasis in 
the industry has shifted from increasing capacity to 
increasing efficiency. 
Characterization of the New Eng1and Texti1e Finishing 
Industry 
The New England textile finishing industry is 
characterized by: 
* Declining total employment 
* Rising import competition 
* Large numbers of small or medium sized establishments 
* Lower wages relative to manufacturing as a whole 
* A move to seek niches where firms can insulate themselves 
from foreign competition 
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This characterization will be used t o argue that the 
industry cannot be called fle x ibly spe cialized in the 
classic sense of the definition, but that, as discussed 
above it rather has "touches" of flexibility . 
Total Employment in Textile Finishing 
Total employment in the textile industry has been 
declining in New England since the South became a 
significant competitor in the market after 1880. The 
industry in New England is now also facing intense 
competition from imports. In Rhode Island alone between 
1949 and 1978 seventy three textile mills closed, causing a 
loss of some 20,122 jobs (Greenhouse Compact, 1983). 
In the textile finishing SIC codes 2231, 2251, 2252, 
2257, 2258, 2261, 2262, 2269, 2281, and 2295, total 
employment in the United States fell from 389,800 in 1972 to 
290,700 in 1987, a 34.1 percent decline. In contrast to 
this picture of a declining industry, the industrial 
district in Prato, Italy where Piore and Sabel (1984) first 
found flexible specialization has had steadily rising 
numbers of jobs. Amin (1989:20) points to a 28.5 percent 
growth in employment in firms with less than 99 employees 
between 1971 and 1981. 9 
9 This increase was f o r all manufacturing firms in the Third 
Ital y , not just textiles. 
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Rising Import Competition 
Table 8 contains import and e xport figures in the 
textile finishing SIC codes for the years 1972 through 1985. 
For the SIC codes in which ~omparisons are possible (ie 
where zero is not reported for both imports and exports or 
one or the other, SIC 2231, 2251, 2257, 2281, 2295) the 
table gives figures on the relative gain or loss made by 
imports over exports. 
In SIC 2231, Weaving and Finishing Mills-Wool, 
imports increased 83.8 percent, from $32 million to $197 
million. During the same period, exports increased 81 
percent from $1.5 million to $7.9 million. 
In SIC code 2251, Women's Hosiery, Except Socks, 
imports increased 84.9 percent, from $10.1 million in 1972 
to $66.8 million. Over the same time period exports 
increased 86 percent from $1.5 million to $10.7 million. 
In SIC 2257, Circular Knit Fabric Mills, imports 
decreased by 316.9 percent from $123 million in 1972 to 
$29.5 million in 1985. Over the same time period exports 
increased 55.2 percent, from $21.4 million to $47.8 million. 
In SIC 2281, Yarn Mills, Except Wool, imports increased 
by 79.1 percent from $29.l million in 1972 to $139.4 million 
in 1985. Over the same time period, e xports increased by 
71.5 percent from $22.6 million to $79.4 million. 
In SIC 2295 imports increased 49. 8 percent from $30.l 
million in 1972 to $59.9 million in 1985. Over the same 
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TABLE 8 
TRADE DATA FOR 1972-1985 
(millions in current dollars) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 !979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
2231 Wea;ing and Finishing Mill s - Woo 
Value of Impar~s 32 44 .3 34.7 32.6 
Value of Exports 1. 5 4.1 3.6 
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22:2 Hoisery, n.e.c. 
Value of Imports 0 0 0 I) 0 
Val ue of Export s < 'l ·Jt L 4.4 6.3 6.7 8.5 
2257 Circular Knit Fabric Mills 
Value of Imports 123 
Value of Exports 21.4 
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2258 Warp Kn it Fabric Mills 
IJal ue of Imports 0 0 
Value of Exports 0 0 
2261 Finishing Plants-Cotton 
Value of Imports 0 0 
Value of Exports 0 0 






2262 Finishing Plants-Manmade Fibers 
Val ue of Imports I) 0 0 
Value of Exports 0 0 0 
2269 Finishing Plants, n.e.:. 
Value of Imports 0 0 
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2281 Yarn Mills, Except Woo l 
Value of Imports 29.1 30 . 1 
Value of Exports 22.6 40.1 
20.2 
64 . 1 
14.1 32 . 8 
42.4 50.2 
43 8L.1 49 60.9 74.6 
52.9 63.9 103.8 112 ll8.3 
83.9 113.4 142.? 139.4 
87.9 80.5 69 . 4 79.4 
2295 Coated Fabrics, Not Rubberized 
Value of Imports 30.l 36.4 22 .7 
Val ue of Exports 46 .6 65.5 77.! 






22 2'.2.5 24.1 27.1 22.7 25.8 
75.5 97.3 94.2 99.8 77.7 74.2 
Note: Some of the SICs for wh ich ~erJ t•3de activit y is gi v2n, are thus 
reported becaus2 the trade jata has been adjusted to ma ke a consistent time 
ser ies for the 197:-198S ti:e ;e·1od. 
Source: '.TA, Deparhen~ : ! ~:--~r:2 
. 00 
36 . 1 59. 9 
76. 5 62.8 
time period exports increased 25.8 percent from $46.6 
million to $62.8 million. 
The percent increases for e xports are somewhat 
misleading when compared with percent increases for imports 
as the import figures are much larger than the export 
figures. 
Significant Numbers of Small or Medium Sized Establishments 
Table 9 contains the numbers of establishments in the 
textile finishing SIC codes, and the number of 
establishments with employees of 1-19, 20-99, and over 100. 
If one defines "small and medium sized firms" as those 
employing under 100 persons, then in the ten textile 
finishing SIC codes the following percentages comprise small 
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TOTAL NUMBERS EMPLOYED IN TEXTILE FINISHING 
SIC CODES FOR THE UNITED STATES, 1987 
ALL ESTABS 1 TO 19 20 TO 99 100 AND OVER 
118 50 39 29 
161 68 43 50 
426 150 172 104 
334 124 115 95 
241 82 102 57 
218 113 62 43 
268 145 56 67 
183 89 58 36 
414 63 86 265 
186 94 64 28 
2549 978 797 774 
SOURCE: 1987 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES 
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(Note: these figures are for the United States as a whole, 
but it is assumed that the numbers in each group are 
somewhat proportional at the New England regional level) 
Apart from SIC 2281, Yarn Mills, Except Wool, over 65 
percent of establishments employ under 100 persons in all 
SIC codes. SIC 2295, Coated Fabrics, Not Rubberized, has 
the highest percent of its workforce employed in 
establishments with below 100 employees, with almost 85 
percent in small or medium sized establishments. These 
figures support the assertion that the textile finishing 
industry is made up of relatively small firms. The textile 
finishing industry can thus be characterized as 
disintegrated, but agglomeration does not appear to be the 
factor that has influenced spatial location. Location, as 
stated previously is more a result of the original location 
of the industry as it grew up in New England from the late 
1700s on. 
Lower Average Wages Relative · to Manufacturing as a Whole 
The textile industry as a whole has lower wage levels 
relative to manufacturing. In 1980 textile wages 
represented 69.7 percent of the amount paid for all 
manufacturing wages. By 1989 this percentage had risen to 
73.3 percent. Work hours however rose more slowly in 
textiles than in manufacturing as a whole, so total take 
home pay still lagged behind. 
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Textile Firms Seek Niches 
In the face of increased competition, many textile 
firms are seeking market niches to insulate themselves fr om 
foreign competitors. Here they have advantages in the way 
they use their e x isting machinery to produce a superior 
product to the foreign import. The implications of this f o r 
flexible specialization are that we may well have identifi ed 
a new dimension to the theory. Although few if any of the 
traits of fle x ibility under Piore and Sable have been 
identified, the fle x ibility in the use of machinery does 
provide a new, finer dimension to the basic theory. 
Conc1usion 
This chapter has drawn conclusions about the occurrence 
of flexibility in textile finishing and has defined the t ype 
and degree of flexible specialization, if any, that is 
occurring. It has also characterized the textile finishing 
industry in New England in terms of the key areas that 
prevent it from being termed as flexibly specialized under 
Piore and Sabel's (1984) definition. 
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CHAPTER 7 
FINDINGS OF THE INDUSTRY INTERVIEWS 
This chapter summarizes the industry interviews that 
were conducted at three Rhode Island firms. The names of 
the companies have been changed to maintain confidentiality. 
At each interview, a predetermined format was used. 
Questions pertained to the company's history, production 
process, location, employees, customer/supplier relations, 
and perceptions of the future of the industry and the impact 
of imports. 
Company History 
At the X Company the owner stated that there are only 
three to four vertically integrated companies left in the 
United States that still produce fabric from the beginning 
of the process through to the end (ie animal or plant 
through to the finished cloth). Company X is one of these. 
Thirty three years ago the father of the current owner 
bought one third of the company. The original equipment is 
still used. 
The ABC Company is one of the few totally integrated 
textile firms left in the country. Aside from buying wool 
from New Zealand and Australia, all the production to the 
finished product is carried out by the company. 
The company was founded in 1919 in Worcester, MA. The 
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founders came from Bradford, England to the United States. 
In Worcester they merged their textiles specialties of 
yarnmaking and fabric manufacturing. In the beginning they 
conducted their yarn and fabric business in two separate 
buildings in the Worcester area. 
As the business grew , a new plant was needed for the 
growing business. In 1929 the company moved to a larger 
facility in Rhode Island. The company remained there until 
1939, when it moved to its present location. The company 
has grown to take up all five floors of the building, plus 
the adjacent yarn annex; a total of 550,000 square feet of 
space. In 1958 the company added a dye department, the 
weave department was expanded in 1965. In the 1970s yarn 
manufacturing capabilities were increased, and in 1988 a 
complete yarn preparation area and computerized material 
handling were introduced. 
Today the company is one of the leading producers of 
fancy wool and wool-blended worsted fabrics. 
The Y Company used to have a plant in the South, but 
this closed down in 1978-79. Today the New England firm is 
more integrated than it has ever been. 
Production Process 
At the X firm, fabrics for home furnishings and wall 
coverings as well as apparel, are processed. The company 
processes materials such as wool, rayon, polyester, cotton, 
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silk, and flax. 
The mill performs sponging, whereby material is treated 
to prevent shrinkage. The processes used include high 
temperature steaming and cold water shrinking. The owner 
commented that the firm has the advantage over larger, more 
integrated companies because this is all it does, and 
therefore the company can provide a specialized service. 
The cold water washing process used at the firm is 
continuous. Other processes carried out in the mill 
however, are batch operations. 
At the ABC Company, processes include top dying, 
package dying, and piece dying, weaving and spinning. 
The ABC Company is the leading U.S. firm in its 
industry and is known for its high quality fabrics. 
The ABC Company is vertically integrated by necessity 
as there are very few firms that do the high grade work that 
the company requires. 
The company still buys some yarn, although the overall 
trend is to further vertical integration as the market is 
too specialized and fancy. Much of the work has to be 
carried out in-house as the batches are too small to make it 
economical to be done outside. The Abe Company makes 
extensive use of technology. Many machines are computer-
controlled, and there is very sophisticated materials 
handling. Finished products are customized for individual 
customers. The Company's latest innovation is the linkage, 
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via computer network, of its designers' offices in New York 
with the production facilities in Rhode Island. A designer 
in New York can sit at a technical work station with a 
client, choose a fabric, and a sample of the finished 
product can be manufactured almost instantaneously. 
The Y Company asserts that flexibility within the 
company has been desired for the last 10-15 years, from the 
time the world economy began to have an impact on the 
company. 
Much of the industry is comprised of family-owned 
companies. The number of owners is small, and many owners 
have known each other and have done business the same way 
for years. 
The equipment used by the Y Company is old but it 
carries out its own maintenance program, with a maintenance 
shop on-site. This is a very expensive part of total 
operation. 
The company manages to stay ahead of foreign 
competition at this time due · to the technologically advanced 
way it uses chemical processes. Alterations in this 
chemical process and methodology is what gives the firm 
competitive advantage, not getting new machinery. New 
machinery plays a relatively minor role. 
The company has gravitated increasingly to the 
production of fabric for industrial sporting goods and away 
from fashion goods due to the violability of the latter 
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market. For example the firm makes parachutes for the 
government which is a reliable product line. 
Diversification is the key to the firm's strategy to 
survival. 
Location 
The X Company was dr~wn to its present location because 
of its loading area and size. The owner would consider 
moving to Connecticut where incentives to business are good, 
if he didn't own the current site. He claims Rhode Island 
is a very expensive state to do business in. Workers 
compensation, taxes, high insurance, and health care costs 
are more expensive in Rhode Island relative to other states. 
The firm has moved to cost-sharing on health insurance. 
Important locational considerations are satisfied by 
the current site's access to highways, quality of life in 
the state, and a large labor pool. 
The city in which Company X is located does not provide 
incentives to small businesses. The owner also talked of 
the problems he had experienced with the Department of 
Environmental Management and its constant queries regarding 
his business. He believes that both the city and state ~o 
not care whether businesses survive. 
The ABC Company would prefer to be located in a one 
story building. There is no elevator in the current 
building. But the company has decided to live with the 
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problem, as the cost of moving would be somewhere in the 
region of $4 million. 
Employees 
The X firm is not unionized, and this the owner 
believes gives him greater flexibility in managing his 
employees. Other firms sub-contract to the company. The 
firm does not want a union as this would interfere with the 
current flexible policies. 
Quality control is important to the business as it 
operates on a thin margin. Workers are employed for a forty 
hour work week. It is important that workers are 
responsible, reliable, and will stay with the company for a 
long period of time. The rationale here is that the longer 
they stay, the more operations they are capable of 
performing. Everyone in the company is expected to be 
capable of performing all the functions, although inevitably 
some are better at certain tasks than others. Many of the 
persons who work at the mill are recovering alcoholics, some 
are high-school dropouts, and some are illiterate. The 
skills required of the workers are patience to stay at a 
repetitive job for the whole day. New employees are 
expected to learn how to use three of the machines at the 
mill within three months of being hired. The type of prior 
experience that the owner looks for is any work related to 
the textile industry , as this shows that workers will know 
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what to expect when they start the job. There is certain 
amount of hiring of younger family members of current 
employees. 
In 1976 the ABC Company instituted a Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan (ESOP), with limited shares available for 
employee ownership. Today, the company is 100 % employee 
owned, after a previous chairman of the board sold his 
family's shares in t he company. 
According to management of the ABC Company, it is 
easier to hire trained workers in the South, where working 
in the textile indus try is treated as a profession, than the 
North where skilled labor is in shorter supply, workman 
compensation, taxes, and insurance costs are higher, and 
states do not help companies as they do in the south. 
The company currently employs 550 workers. This is a 
reduction from the high of 750 in 1986. The company still 
runs three sh i fts de spite the downturn. 
The training period for a weaver is approximately eight 
weeks. To be able t o work ten to twelve looms, it can take 
up to six months. This is the best paid of the non-
managerial jobs. The training period for yarn spinning is 
six to eight weeks, and these workers are expected to be 
able to eventuall y work four frames. Today there are fewer 
people doing a wider range of jobs within the firm. 
Openings usually occur in the off-shifts. There is a 
high turnover o f sta f f , but this has been markedly less 
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since the start of the economic downturn. With this 
downturn, the company has been able to become much more 
picky in whom it hires. Fifty four percent of the workforce 
is comprised of minorities. This leads to both cultural and 
language problems. 
The union system at Company Y works on a two-tier basis 
of one wage for new employees, and a higher wage for older 
employees. Bottom tier wages are $8.00 - $10.50, and top 
tier wages range from $9.60 - $10.50. 
A few years ago the company would hire anyone, but in 
today's tight market the personnel department likes to see a 
high-school diploma, to show that the person can stick at 
something. 
In terms of future direction, the workforce needs to 
gain more motivation than it currently possesses. 
Fundamental changes in the attitude of the workforce need to 
occur. To this end, the company is introducing a profit-
sharing plan, and training people to show the importance of 
team effort. It is believed that workers should be included 
in the planning process to help avoid existing problems, and 
to utilize their specialist knowledge to develop new 
projects in a more successful way. The company also faces 
the problem that the industry does not attract smart, 
motivated people who want to work to improve the company. 
This change in attitude will require a change in the 
attitudes, not just of the people on the floor, but also of 
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the foremen. 
The workforce of Company Y currently stands at 340 
employees. This is down from 390. The company wishes to 
keep the current number, and offer overtime where necessary, 
rather than taking on extra staff. All the full-time 
workers have health insurance paid by the company. 
In terms of flexibility of jobs done by the workers, 
all employees are hired to do a specific job. Some textile 
firms pay more to workers according to the number of jobs 
that they are able to perform. However, this is not the 
case at Y Company, unless there is no alternative because a 
person is sick and the system would be unable to run without 
that operator. 
Customers/Suppliers 
Customers of the X Company are mainly located in the 
New York metropolitan area. Some are also located in New 
Bedford and Fall River, Massachusetts. The owner did not 
think local links were important. Nonetheless, being on the 
Eastern Seaboard is important, and the owner thinks parts of 
the textile industry will never go south, because New York 
remains the center of the garment industry. 
The Y Company was bought out by one of its customers, 
who is a convertor. Today the parent company represents 
about 30% of the firm's business. With the parent company 
buying the company out, 30% of its business is guaranteed to 
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them. 
Customers are very small in number and familiar t o the 
firm. The firm sells to convertors, who sell to the 
manufacturers. A convertor is in effect an integrator who 
owns the goods. Convertors arrange the different phases of 
the production process in disparate firms. Companies do not 
cross the commission-convertor line. The parent c ompany is 
a convertor, and there is an unwritten code of ethics that 
the firms abide by, and that keep the firm's markets open by 
keeping individual convertors at arm's length. 
Suppliers are local. The company tries to use local 
suppliers due to low transportation costs. The percentage 
of costs made up by transportation is less than in other 
industries. Such factors as the supply of materials is 
vital, for example, the firm had to shut down for a week due 
to no oil being available. However if the difference 
between two prices is minimal, the firm tries to always go 
with the local bidder. 
Future of the Industry and Imports 
The owner of X Company does not predict any large 
amount of growth for the textile industry in the near 
future. He plans to continue to hire the same type o f 
employee: illiterates rather than high school graduates and 
if anything would prefer to see more high school dropouts 
available f o r hire. 
8 0 
Overseas competition does not really come from Japan, 
but there is a problem from other south-east Asian 
countries, such as Taiwan and Hong Kong. The Y Company 
manages to maintain its competitive edge in market niches 
due to: its technological advantage; access to dollar 
resources, and its ability to count on quick delivery time. 
Despite efforts at Y Company to remain in the market, 
the Plant Supervisor, when questioned, predicted that within 
the next five years, one of the major remaining firms in the 
region will go out of business, due to rising import 
competition and falling demand for services. 
In terms of foreign competition Company Y tries to go 
with technologically strict product lines that require quick 
deliveries and offer nearby distribution centers. 
The firm is increasingly faced with intense competition 
from countries such as Taiwan, where wages are so low that 
the firm has no choice but to back out of competition in 
that sector of the market. A major problem here is that a 
lot of the costs are perceived to come from having to meet 
strict environmental standards, which companies from the 
Far-East are not obliged to meet. 
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CHAP~R8 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The United States enjoyed a position of international 
dominance in manufacturing after the Second World War. Yet, 
the last twenty five years has seen the erosion of that 
position. The textile industry shows many of the woes of 
the rest of manufacturing: declining profits, reduction in 
employment within the industry, plant closings, and markets 
being eaten away by cheap imports. The loss of ground in 
many areas of manufacturing has prompted debate surrounding 
the reasons for the causes of declining economic 
performance. Some argue the present deterioration in 
economic performance results from the limits of the model of 
industrial development founded on mass production {Piore, 
Sabel, 1984). It is asserted that the most successful 
industries in the new global economy are those that are 
characterized by spatially dense networks of relatively 
small, vertically disintegrated firms. In other words, 
companies characterized by flexible specialization . 
. 
This project addresses this debate by taking a 
systematically selected industry for a case study {textile 
finishing) and analyzing whether flexible specialization is 
occurring. The analysis uses both primary and secondary 
sources. Industry interviews with textile finishing firms 
in Rhode Island provide a first-hand picture of where the 
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industry stands as we enter the 1990s. Secondary sources on 
the industry provided a broader base of information from 
which more general trends can be ascertained. Several 
characteristics and conclusions can be drawn about the 
textile finishing industry. 
Characteristics 
Total Employment 
Total employment within textile finishing has declined 
since 1972. Employment in textile finishing in 1972 was 
389.8 thousand. By 1987 this number had declined to 290.7 
thousand. This represents a decrease of 34.1 percent. Due 
to stagnant demand, the industry is switching emphasis from 
increasing capacity to increasing efficiency. 
This decline in textile jobs has severe implications 
for the workforce, much of which is being made redundant. 
Manufacturing jobs have traditionally paid a good wage to 
workers who are unskilled or semi-skilled. Manufacturing 
jobs are being replaced by service sector jobs paying lower 
wages. The implications of this provides a real problem 
which must be addressed. 
Union membership in the textile industry has continued 
to decline since 1970 (Statistical Abstracts, 1990) . 
Further, the reason why wages in many service sector jobs 
are low is because they are non-unionized jobs. 
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Rising Import Competition and Firm Size 
The textile industry is suffering as a result of rising 
import competition. Rising import shares in the domestic 
market have led to a period of rethinking on the part of the 
U.S. textile industry. Consolidations have been rampant in 
many sections of the textile industry. Textile finishing, 
however, is somewhat different in organization. This 
segment of the larger industry is comprised of many small 
and medium sized firms. Figures from the 1987 Census of 
Manufactures reveal that 72.4 percent of all textile 
finishing firms have fewer than 100 employees. 
The finishing industry is thus highly disintegrated. Many 
of these small firms operate on a narrow profit margin, 
which puts them in a vulnerable position with rising import 
competition. At the interview with Company Y, this reality 
was brought home when the Plant Supervisor offered the 
opinion that at least one of the five major textile 
finishers in the area will go out of business in the next 
five years as a direct result of increasing competition from 
abroad. 
Lower Average Wages Relative to Manufacturing as a Whole 
Textile wages continued to be lower than manufacturing 
as a whole, although as a percentage of manufacturing wages 
the figure rose from 69.7 percent in 1980 to 73.3 percent in 
1989. In the interview at Company X, the President stated 
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the company paid its workers more if they knew more jobs. 
This allowed the firm greater flexibility with its 
workforce. If one worker did not come in on a given day, 
then another would be very available to fill in. 
Niche Production 
In an attempt to meet competition from imports, the 
textile finishing industry in New England is increasingly 
retreating from markets threatened imports, and seeking out 
niche markets where U.S. firms have an edge over imports. 
Use of Machinery 
In many cases the industry is using old dedicated 
machinery in innovative, flexible ways to produce different 
products. For example, at Company Y, one machine was used 
to dye two very different types of cloth, one plain, and one 
with a camouflage pattern. The literature on flexible 
specialization begins to address the issue of dedicated 
machinery, but does not go far enough. Walker (1990) points 
to the source of confusion over the misplaced emphasis on 
scale of output instead of production methods. He points 
out that one may get very long runs out of generalized 
machinery or short runs out of dedicated machinery, with 
corresponding effects on overall efficiency of labor and 
machine use, but the principles of mechanical improvement in 
each case are differe nt. Walker raises an important issue 
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but does not go far enough to emphasize the importance of 
looking more closely at dedicated machinery. 
Conc1usions 
Because of the lack of agreement as to an exact 
definition of fle xible specialization and what it 
encompasses, the question of whether flexible specialization 
is occurring in textile finishing in New England is a 
difficult one. However, based on the existing literature, 
and analysis from the information used in this project 
several conclusions can be drawn. 
Textile Finishing as a Traditional Declining Industry 
Textile finishing is a traditional industry, using old 
machinery. To the outsider, production methods appear to 
have changed little in fifty years. Employment in the 
industry has declined dramatically, and is continuing to do 
so. Management practices appear to be somewhat flexible and 
sensitive to the changes occurring within the industry. At 
Company X, for e xample, the President took advantage of the 
absence of a union to practice flexible policies on allowing 
time off to workers. 
Meeting the Cha l lenges of the New Global Economy 
The texti le finishing industry is trying to face the 
changes that have occurred as a result of the globalization 
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of business and trade. Because many of the firms are small 
they are unable to invest in the high-tech machinery that 
would provide greater fle x ibility. Also the face the 
problem of a tenuous market position and the lack of 
capital. Instead, they are making do with e x isting 
machinery and using it in innovative ways, thus injecting 
flexibility into dedicated machinery. The industry has also 
gotten rid of excess labor to improve its productivity and 
has shifted it s emphasis from increasing capacity to 
increasing efficiency. 
The Need for Further Study 
This study uncovered a particular strategy for 
flexibility that the academic literature appears to have 
overlooked: the use of dedicated machinery in flexible ways. 
Research in this area would provide the industry with 
invaluable knowledge as to the relative gains such fle x ible 
practices could yield. Further, it would add an important 
component to the emerging definition of flexibility. 
Policy Implications 
It appears inevitable that jobs will continue to be 
lost in textile finishing in New England. Yet the e x istence 
of these jobs is c rucial to many families who have worked in 
New England tex t iles for generations. Indeed, the reason 
many of t hese wo r kers ' families came to the United States 
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was to work in the mills. Loss of these jobs for semi-
skilled and unskilled workers has severe repercussions both 
for the workers and the state. Education programs may have 
to be provided to retrain workers, as most jobs today 
outside manufacturing require a minimum of a high school 
diploma. The minimum qualification stated by each of the 
three firms interviewed was a high school diploma, but each 
company stated that it did hire workers without a high 
school diploma when necessary. Indeed, at Company X, the 
President stated that what he needed most was more high 
school dropouts. 
The ABC Company stated that 54 percent of its workforce 
was comprised of minorities. Many of these workers speak 
little, if any English. If these workers are to be 
integrated into service sector jobs requiring use of English 
language skills then language training will also need to be 
provided. 
Implications for Community Planning 
The implications of flexible specialization are 
profound for the profession of planning. In order to plan 
well one must have a thorough knowledge of the developments 
that shape the landscape. If the perception used to plan is 
one which is outdated, the plan that results will lead to 
failure. It is essential that all planners are aware of the 
impact that economic change, flexibly specialized or 
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otherwise, has had and continues to have on the landscape. 
Planning Practice 
Planners in several areas of the world have integrated 
the theory of flexible specialization into their economic 
development policies. Examples include Barcelona, Spain 
where the road network has been built to provide networks 
between firms and encourage the growth of agglomeration. In 
Pennsylvania, Sabel has been involved in integrating 
flexible specialization into the state's economic 
development policy. Similarly, Scott and Storper are 
working with state government to establish an electric 
automobile industrial complex in Greater Los Angeles. 
Planning Methods 
The use of old methods (e.g. location quotients, shift-
share analysis) yield very shallow insights into what is 
occurring today. The old methods used to predict economic 
development strategies assume little if any change and are 
inappropriate for today's unstable situation. Further, the 
old methods are based on a theory of growth (investment and 
constant, but slow technological change) that is largely 
irrelevant today. 
Theory of Planning 
The transformation from fordism to flexible 
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accumulation is a profound and fundamental shift in the 
political economy. This shift has resulted, and will 
continue to result, in a change in the way that cities grow 
and develop. The emergenc~ of flexible specialization and 
the impact that it has had on the way business is done 
highlights the fact that planners are actually not in 
control of the development process. Until we reach a stage 
where geographic industrialization is planned, cities will 
not be planned either. 
In conclusion, it may take a national economic 
development strategy to provide the kind of planned economic 
development needed for the country to be able to continue to 
be competitive in the new global economy. A federally 
instigated economic development program might require 
overriding many of the powers given to states under the 
separation of powers. Loss of some control to the federal 
government may be a high price for the states to pay, but 
slipping into minor economic status in a New World Order is 
a higher one. The issue must be addressed before the worst 
case scenario becomes reality. 
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